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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
tween suits at law and in equity,9 6 and in light of the broad powers
afforded our courts to grant any type of relief justifiable, under
CPLR 3017.97 Moreover, the procedural advantages of an account-
ing in the situation posed by the transaction appeared to be clear.
In view of the peculiar appropriateness of the fact situation,
the decision of the Court of Appeals, to deny an accounting,
appears to be unfortunate.
ARTiCLE 31- DiscLosunE
CPLR 3101(a): Court of Appeals interprets "umaterial and
necessary."y
CPLR 3101 (a) mandates that "[t]here shall be full disclosure
of all evidence material and necessary in the prosecution or defense
of an action. . . ." The spirit with which the words "material and
necessary" are to be construed has been demonstrated by the Court
of Appeals in Allen v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co.,9 wherein it
has endorsed the liberal interpretation given 3101(a) by various
lower courts.99 The test as to what is "material and necessary"
when disclosure is sought is, in the words of the Court, one of
"usefulness and reason." '00
In approving an extremely liberal construction of CPLR
3101(a) the Court has adopted what practice commentators have
strenuously urged.' 0 The Allen case reflects a new philosophy of
litigation which scorns stingy pre-litigation practice. Hopefully,
lower courts, cognizant of the Allen case, will think in negative
916 CPLR 103(a), provides:
"One form of action. There is only one form of civil action. The dis-
tinction between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of those
actions and suits, have been abolished."
97 CPLk 3017(a), provides, inter alia:
"[T]be court may grant any type of relief within its jurisdiction appro-
priate to the proof whether or not demanded, imposing such terms as may
be just."
9821 N.Y.2d 403, 235 N.E2d 430, 288 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1968). In Allen,
plaintiffs brought a class action for severance pay. Plaintiffs sought answers
to certain interrogatories concerning defendant's retirement and severance pay
procedures, and practices at its other offices and plants. The lower courts
sustained a motion to strike these interrogatories.9 9 Rios v. Donovan, 21. App. Div. 2d 409, 250 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1st Dep>t
1964); West v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 49 Misc. 2d 28, 266 N.Y.S.2d 600
(Sup.. Ct. Onondaga County 1965). See The Quarterly Svn'ey of New
York Practice, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 303, 304, 305 (1966).
'10021 N.Y.2d at 406, 235 N.E.2d at 432, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
1013 WENsTEiN, KoRN & MILLER, NEW YoRK CrvmL PRAcTIcE fff 3101.04,
3101.07, 3101.08 (1966); see also 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3101, supp. com-
mentary 14-19 (1967).
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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY
terms when deciding disclosure motions and will deny them only
where the information sought is totally useless, irrelevant or
immaterial.
CPLR 3102(f): Disclosure not available when state is non-party
witness.
Prior to the enactment of the CPLR disclosure was not avail-
able against the state in any. court.10 2  With the enactment of the
CPLR, disclosure against the state became available, first, in the
Court of Claims by order of that court, 0 3 and subsequently, by
court order, in any action in which the state was properly a
party.Y0 4  This liberal trend in favor of private litigants has, to
some extent, remedied an unjust situation which previously exist-
ed.205
CPLR 3102(f) presently provides that "[i]n an action in
which the state is properly a party, whether as plaintiff, defendant
or otherwise, disclosure by the state shall be available as if the
state were a private person, except that it may be obtained only
by order of the court in which the action is pending. . . ." In
Butironi v. Putnam County Civil Service Comt'n,00 plaintiff sought
disclosure against the state as a non-party witness. The court held
that disclosure under 3102(f) was not available in such circum-
stances. Hopefully, a second liberalization process will begin with
respect to disclosure against the state in actions where it is a non-
party witness.
CPLR 3120(b): Court disallows non-party's disclosure
expenses temporarily.
CPLR 3120(b) provides for the discretionary allowance of
costs and for the defrayal of expenses of a non-party who is
ordered to make disclosure. In a recent case, In re Stauderman's
WVill, 07 the surrogate's court, Nassau County, disallowed a non-
102 Schmiedel v. State, 14 App. Div. 2d 33, 217 N.Y.S.2d 110 (4th Dep't
1961); Carey v. Standard Brands, 12 App. Div. 2d 233, 210 N.Y.S.2d 849
(3d Dep't 1961).
103 Di Santo v. State, 22 App. Div. 2d 289, 254 N.Y.S.2d 965 (3d Dep't
1964).
104 State v. Master Plumbers Ass'n, 47 Misc. 2d 187, 262 N.Y.S.2d 323
(Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1965). But see State v. Boar's Head Provi-
sions Co., 46 Misc. 2d 759, 260 N.Y.S.2d 418 (Sup. Ct. New York County
1965) (neither state nor its officers subject to pre-trial examination).
105 7Bl McKINNEY'S CPLR 3102, supp. commentary 60 (1967). Under prior
law the state, while itself immune from disclosure, could obtain disclosure
from the opposing party.
10029 App. Div. 2d 474, 288 N.Y.S.2d 734 (2d Dep't 1968).
107 56 Misc. 2d 580, 289 N.Y.S.2d 703 (Surr. Ct. Nassau County 1968).
1968 ]
